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NOTES ON RECENT LEADING ARTICLES IN LEGAL
PERIODICALS.
JUDICIARY.
Independence of the Judiciary. Hon. Judson Harmon. In the begin-
ning of his article Judge Harmon makes, by means of his eloquent
phrasing, the old story of Coke's stand for judicial independence, newly
fascinating. That the fight fought three centuries ago by Lord Coke
is not even yet ended, is made plain as he comes to treat of the
contemporary aspects of the subject. It is found that political organiza-
tions are not fitted to be entrusted with the grave task of choosing
the judiciary. Most clearly and vigorously the author sets forth the
situation as it is to-day:
"On every hand men have made haste to be rich, and have not
been innocent. It is written they shall not be innocent. Corporate
officers have forgotten that they are trustees for the stockholders; and
both have forgotten that corporations with public franchises are
trustees for the people. Or, if they have not forgotten, they have not
cared. Fraud and graft have burrowed deep in private enterprises.
Executive and legislative officers have been convicted and sentenced
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for infamous official crimes. The people are aroused by reason of
numerous frauds and impositions practiced on them, and by the insolent
parade and misuse of wealth by persons who utterly lack the character
and training necessary to qualify them to be entrusted with the control
of wealth.
"Under such conditions the temptation to seek or sanction irregular
ju'stice is strong, and the immediate result is apt to hide the more
remote and lasting consequences."
It is in the ability to foresee these lasting consequences and to
stand firmly against the ephemeral demands of the day, however
strong, that Judge Harmon finds the great protective power of an
independent judiciary.
The American Lawyer. Vol. 14, No. 9, PP. 391-393.
The Legitimate Functions of Judge-Made Law. Hon. Hannis Taylor.
We are told that "The world has given birth to only two great
systems of jurisprudence. . . . As the Greek genius lacked the
capacity to produce a philosophy of law, legal science must be regarded
as a Roman creation, jurisprudence as a Roman invention." This
view radically differs from that held by many men to-day, who find
that in law, as in other realms of thought, the creative mind was that
of the Greek, while the Roman mind was largely imitative, with a
great talent for adapting the thoughts of others. That customary law
develops into an "unelastic written Code ;" and the agency of judge-
made law is the only possible way out of the "strait-jacket in which
it thus encases itself," is the avowed doctrine of the article. The argu-
ment is carefully and ably made, the historical development beginning
with the judge-made law of Rome. In the working out of the demon-
stration here, we find the author giving full credit to the Greek philos-
ophy for the expanding and ennobling force that finally lifted the idea
of the Ins Gentium into a higher sphere than it had at first occupied
among the Romans. The importance of the work of "edictal juris-
prudence" throughout all life in the Roman times. is shown; "so
while it may be said that the most famous and widely extended juris-
prudence known to the world begins, as it ends, with a code, the fact
must not for one moment be lost sight of that what gave importance
to the first code and made the last possible, was the creative work
performed by the jurisconsults and magistrates, who, during the ten
centuries between the two, built up a scientific system of judge-made
law, whose influence upon the history of mankind has been second only
to that of Christianity itself."
Passing on to Judge-made law in England the story is found to be
repeated; Digby is quoted to the effect that "decisions of tribunals,
came to constitute in the strictest sense of the term a source or
cause of law. Judge-made or judiciary law henceforth displaces Cus-
tomary law." The agency of the doctrine of Equity is shown, and the
fact noted that in England, unlike Rome, equity "has always abhorred
codification."
In the United States judge-made law, it might seem, would owe its
development in some degree to the world causes and fundamental
principles noted in the growth of the older systems. In Mr. Taylor's
apprehension, however, the universal cause and the fundamental prin-
ciple seem to have been supplanted by Judge Marshall, to whom, it
would seem, we owe the fact that our inflexible constitution has not
kept us confined in our particular legal strait-jacket. Our debt to
Marshall is great; it seems a pity that such exaggeration of that
indebtedness should arise to lessen our sense of genuine gratitude
and admiration. The right of the highest court of the nation to pass
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on the validity of national law, was no "creation of Marshall's 
irre:
sistible logic." It was a doctrine plainly recognized 
in the debates of
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and James 
Wilson had declared
the doctrine many times in those debates, and in 
his speeches before
the ratifying convention of Pennsylvania, as well 
as in the lectures he
delivered before the law class of the University 
of Pennsylvania in
1790. Judge-made law to be a good thing 
would most certainly not
be law made by any one judge in the pattern of 
his own mind, however
great that mind.
The American Lawyer, Vol. 14, No. 9; PP. 400-404.
LEGAL ETHICS.
Some Questions of Legal Ethics Suggested by 
the Life and Career
of Lord Chancellor Bacon, Viscount St. Albans. 
Richard Ashhurst.
Mr. Ashurst notes that for many years after the 
death of Lord Bacon
no attempt was made to rehabilitate his character, 
but that "within
the last half of the i9th century, however, carried 
away by the bril-
liancy of his achievements in Science and Philosophy, 
a school of
writers has been developed, who, unwilling to see 
anything blameable
in the character or conduct of a personage whose 
gigantic intellect
they so rightly revere and admire, have undertaken 
to minimize and
explain away Francis Bacon's misdoings." It is 
very rightly pointed
out that this is carrying the spirit of charitable 
judgment to a dan-
gerous point, since to "minimize and excuse 
his misdeeds, which from
his eminence cannot be forgotten, tends to obscure 
the moral judg-
ment and blind or mislead us as to ethical principles 
when the example
set by the great man of the past is on the wrong 
side." Mr. Ashhurst
undertakes the " invidious duty of again showing 
that the feet of the
great image, or perhaps even higher 
parts of the splendid figure, are
of clay," and he fulfills this duty so well that in the 
end the reader feels,
not so much that Francis Bacon's sins have been 
again shown in all
their blackness, as that professional honor, the 
integrity of the legal
character, and the simple principles of honesty 
and uprightness which
should govern all men, whatever brilliancy of intellect 
they may possess,
have been upheld, defended and set forth in all 
their proper proportions.
The Green Bag. Vol. i8, No. 9, pp. 505-515.
THE YEAR BooKs.
The Year Books. W. S. Holdsworth. Mr. Holdsworth 
here gives
us the first part of a very interesting account of 
the Year Books. The
publication by the Selden Society of a translation 
of a part of the
SMaynard," or Year Book of Edward the Second, from manuscripts
hitherto not published, has given rise to what may 
be called a "renais-
sance" of the old legal learning. That which 
had interested the very
few, now interests-if not the many-at least a 
goodly number. Mr.
Soule, of Boston, who has given us such valuable 
and reliable data in
regard to the Year Books, is much relied upon 
by Mr. Holdsworth, as
indeed he must be by any one speaking or writing 
on the subject.
As we stir what has been regarded as the dead 
dust of those old
records, we find that it begins to glow and 
palpitate with life, and
those who write of it show it blossoming forth 
with quaint anecdote,
witty story, pathetic incident. When Mr. Wallace 
wrote his "Report-
ers" in the middle of the last century he thought 
that only the anti-
quarian who desired to go "beyond beyond," would 
ever care for any
other edition of the Year Books than that edition 
of 1788-80, that was
supposed to be the best as it was the latest. To-day 
that edition stands
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discredited and we seek the productions of the presses of Machlinia,
TPynson, Redman, Tothill, and their immediate successors, all of whom
lived in that dim "beyond beyond" of time, where Mr. Wallace found
so inuch of interest, and where we of to-day are only too glad to
follow him.
The Law Quarterly Review. Vol. 23, No. 87, pp. 266-284.
CAsE LAW.
The Basts of Case Law. A. H. F. Lefroy. It is contended that
"Where there is no governing precedent, direct or indirect, justice
and other principles of right and wrong, the fitness of things, con-
venience and policy, make case law." Also "that if it is the fact, as
it is stated in a recent well-known work, that 'a commonsense or
reasonable view of the circumstances of the case would be considered
a rather audacious ground of judicial decision by most lawyers, more
especially, perhaps, in England,' this is only because the accumulation
of precedents, direct or indirect, has become so great, and the original
foundations of case law are buried so deep beneath the superincumbent
mass, that lawyers have lost sight of them." The author then goes on
to demonstrate the truth of his position by a review of cases in which
there was no authority to guide or control the Court, and in which he
shows that there was a direct appeal to, or reliance* on, the grounds
that he has given as those which make the basis of case law. It seems
that it should be unnecessary to adduce any proof that "justice,
humanity, and morality are primary sources of case" or any other law.
The case that is decided according to a long line of decisions is so
decided because those decisions rest upon such bases, or it is so decided
because the Court is incompetent to discover the evil inherent in the
first decision and the continuous error of those following. In the
latter case it is not the law which is or has been in error but the
individual infirmity-common to all professions-which is to blame.
That the case lawyer sometimes forgets that the cases upon which he
relies have any value beyond the fact that there are many of them
on his side, and that certain judges more or less eminent decided them,
may be true, but it does not alter the fact that the man who relies
u)on a "good case" or a long line of them relies on the fundamental
principles underlying them, whether he is aware of that fact or not.
Mr. Lefroy makes this very clear, and is doing a very good work in
thus showing the true value of case law, which too often rests under
the reproach which should fall upon those who use without under-
standing it. The article is to be continued.
The Law Quarterly Review. Vol. 22, No. 87, pP. 293-306.
